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Abstract: MANET, due to the nature of wireless transmission, has more security issues 
compared to wired environments. A specific type of attack, the Wormhole attack does not 
require exploiting any nodes in the network and can interfere with the route establishment 
process. Instead of detecting wormholes from the role of administrators as in previous 
methods, we implement a new protocol, MHA, using a hop-count analysis from the 
viewpoint of users without any special environment assumptions. We also discuss previous 
works which require the role of administrator and their reliance on impractical assumptions, 
thus showing the advantages of MHA. 
Keywords: ad hoc network; hop-count analysis; MHA; network security; wormhole attack 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The mobile ad-hoc network, MANET [1], is a developing wireless technology that has been 
discussed in many academic research projects in the last decade. An ad-hoc network is inherently a 
OPEN ACCESSSensors 2009, 9                  
 
 
5023
self-organized network system without any infrastructure. Typically, the nodes act as both host and 
router at the same time, i.e., each node in the network can be independent and based on different 
hardware, but when communication is needed it serves as a data transmitting router after a route 
discovery procedure. 
So far, many routing protocols have been proposed for MANET, such as DSDV (Destination 
Sequence Distance Vector) [2], DSR (Dynamic Source Routing) [3] and AODV (Ad-hoc On-Demand 
Vector) [4] and so on. To the best of our knowledge, most previous research has focused on protocol 
establishment and its efficiency in MANET, but secure routing is very important, and some secure 
routing protocols based on DSR and AODV [5-7] have been proposed in these years. 
Recently, a novel exploit called wormhole attack was introduced [8]. In a wormhole attack, 
attackers “tunnel” packets to another area of the network bypassing normal routes as shown in 
Figure 1. In practice, attackers can use high power antennas or a wired link, or other methods. The 
resulting route through the wormhole may have a better metric, i.e., a lower hop-count than normal 
routes. With this leverage, attackers using wormholes can easily manipulate the routing priority in 
MANET to perform eavesdropping, packet modification or perform a DoS (Denial of Service) attack, 
and so on. The entire routing system in MANET can even be brought down using the wormhole attack. 
Its severity and influence has been analyzed in [9]. 
 
Figure 1. The wormhole attack in MANET. 
 
 
Most previous works protecting against wormhole attack use methodologies assuming the 
viewpoint of administrator, trying to identify the wormhole, and then defend against it. They can 
further be classified as centralized systems like MDS-VOW (Multi-Dimensional Scaling -Visualization 
of Wormhole) [10], and distributed systems such as LBK (Local Broadcast Key) [11]. Some require 
substantial calculation and some others employ special nodes in the network. These methods consume 
effort and bandwidth as overhead. There are other similar schemes such as TIK protocol, SAM, 
DelPHI and LITEWORP which will be summarized in Section 2. 
Instead of the viewpoint of administrator, we adopt the viewpoint of users and utilize routing 
information already available in standards like RFC3561. The concept is that we don’t have to spend a 
lot of effort to catch thieves like the police (administrators), but rather lock the doors and windows as 
citizens (users), which is much easier and can avoid most of the threats with minimum effort. Our 
method selects routes and “avoids” rather than “identify” the wormhole resulting in low cost and 
overhead. We propose a multipath routing protocol called Multipath Hop-count Analysis (MHA, for 
short) to avoid wormhole attacks based on a hop-count analysis scheme. It is a highly efficient Sensors 2009, 9                  
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protocol which does not require any special supporting hardware. Furthermore, MHA is designed to 
use split multipath routes, so the transmitted data is naturally split into separate route. An attacker on a 
particular route can not completely intercept (and subvert) our content. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: We review related works regarding wormhole attack 
in Section 2. In Section 3, the MHA protocol is proposed. The simulations are given in Section 4, and 
then comparison and discussion are provided in Section 5. Finally, we present our conclusions and 
future work in Section 6. 
 
2. Related Works 
 
In this section, we review related works in the literature which discuss proposed wormhole attack 
defenses. 
 
2.1. Graph Theoretic Approach 
 
Lazos  et al. [11] proposed a graph theoretic model to characterize the wormhole attack and 
ascertain the necessary and sufficient conditions for any candidate solution to prevent wormholes. 
They used a Local Broadcast Key (LBK) based method to set up a secure ad-hoc network against 
wormhole attacks. In other words, there are two kinds of nodes in their network: guards and regular 
nodes. Guards access the location information through GPS or some other localization method like 
SeRLoc [12] and continuously broadcast location data. Regular nodes must calculate their location 
relative to the guards’ beacons, thus they can distinguish abnormal transmission due to beacon 
retransmission by the wormhole attackers. All transmissions between node pairs have to be encrypted 
by the local broadcast key of the sending end and decrypted at the receiving end. As a result, the time 
delay accumulates per node traveled. In addition, special localization equipment has to be applied to 
guard nodes for detecting positions. 
 
2.2. Packet Leashes 
 
In [9], Hu et al. introduced a packet leashes method to restrict the time that packets can be 
transferred. They propose the TIK protocol based on TESLA [13] and use temporal  leashes to 
determine the wormhole attack by transmission time. Consequently, TIK requires precisely 
synchronized time among the nodes. In addition, TIK combines hash tree authentication to ensure the 
time information in the control packet is not modified. Therefore, the receiver can confirm if the 
packet transmission distance satisfies the restriction that sender has claimed. The TIK packet is 
transmitted by S as: 
S → R: <HMACKi(M), M, T, Ki> 
Where: 
     HMACKi(M): HMAC for verifying the content; 
     M: Plaintext; 
     T: Values needed for authentications; 
Ki: The key for time interval Ti-1~Ti. Sensors 2009, 9                  
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Before the sender sends a packet P, it estimates an upper bound tr on the arrival time of the HMAC 
at the receiver. Then it picks a key Ki which will not expire before the receiver gets the packet’s 
HMAC, i.e., Ti > tr + Δ, where Δ is the synchronized error between sender and receiver. Next, the 
sender computes the HMACKi(M) with Ki and attaches the HMAC to the packet. The sender then 
discloses the key Ki after the key has expired. After the receiver obtains the HMAC, it first checks if 
the key is expired. If the sender has not sent the corresponding key Ki, the key is available. The 
receiver later uses the hash tree root m and the hash tree value T to verify the Ki at the end of the 
packet authentication, then it uses the authenticated Ki to verify the HMAC value in the packet. If all 
these verifications are correct, the packet is accepted as authenticated. 
However, the assumptions of TIK are impractical. It depends on precisely synchronized time 
between all nodes and assumes the packet sending and receiving delays are negligible. The wormhole 
is discovered because it passes packets more slowly than normal routes. Furthermore, knowledge of 
the positions of all nodes may be a prerequisite for correctly estimating transmission times. 
 
2.3. Other Protocols and Mechanisms 
 
In [10], Wang et al. designed MDS-VOW, a topology visualization system, to visualize the network 
topology of a sensor network and detect wormholes. In [14], Qian et al. presented the SAM protocol 
which analyzes the frequency of nodes used, and flags overuse as abnormal. In [15], Maheshwari et al. 
used the information of connectivity to find wormhole. In [16], Naït-Abdesselam et al. used link 
information for wormhole detection based on the OLSR protocol. There are other works that focus on 
defending against wormhole attacks in MANET, such as DelPHI in [17] and LITEWORP in [18], and 
so on. However, most of these mechanisms require some special assumptions and supporting hardware, 
and some of them are based on specific protocols. 
 
3. A Proposed Robust Scheme Based on Hop-Count Analysis (MHA) 
 
3.1. The Concept of MHA 
 
We illustrate the concept of MHA in Figure 2. The normal routes for a particular communication 
pair contain 5~6 hops; the route under a wormhole attack has a hop-count of 2. We see the route under 
the wormhole attack has a smaller hop-count than normal. As a result, users who avoid routes with 
relatively small hop-counts can avoid most wormhole attacks. 
In MHA, we first examine the hop-count values of all routes. Then we choose a safe set of routes 
for data transmission. Finally, we randomly transmit packets through safe routes. Even if the 
wormhole is not avoided in some severe cases, we can still minimize the rate of using the route path 
through the wormhole. The simulation results are shown in Section IV. 
In our work, we refer to RFC3561 [4], i.e., the AODV routing protocol, to set up MHA. We use the 
control packets as in RFC3561 and modify them to satisfy our requirements. Their modified functions 
are defined in the following section. For example, the RREQ packet is used for route discovery and the 
RREP packet is used for route reply, and so on. Figure 3 shows the RREQ packet format in MHA. 
While most fields stay as they were in RFC 3561, in addition, we define a field called check flag (CF), Sensors 2009, 9                  
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which is used with RREQ ID to distinguish new RREQ packets from old ones in MHA. The CF is also 
included in the RREP packet. A RREQ packet with CF = 0 is served as a normal route discovery, 
while CF ≠ 0 represents the graylist broadcast, which is introduced in section 3.3. The source node 
triggers the graylist broadcast based on the result of hop-count analysis. 
 
Figure 2. Distinguishing safe routes from hop-count values. 
 
 
Figure 3. RREQ packet format of MHA protocol. 
 
 
The MHA contains four parts. The route establishment is introduced in Section 3.2, and graylist 
broadcast is illustrated in 3.3. The hop-count analysis scheme is proposed in 3.4. Finally, the route 
maintenance method is given in 3.5. The notations used are listed in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Notations. 
Parameter Represents 
CF  The check flag value 
IPS / IPD  The source/destination IP address 
RREPlim  RREP number limit 
γ  Number of received RREP packets 
α, β  The lower, upper bound for route selection 
m, n  The lowest, highest hop-count of legal routes 
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3.2. Route Establishment in MHA 
 
The source node launches a route discovery procedure if there is a communication requirement. It 
first adds IPS, IPD and RREQ ID in the RREQ packet, then sets the hop-count = 0 and attaches an 
expiration time to the RREQ packet. Later, the RREQ packet is broadcasted into the network and 
received by surrounding nodes. In Figure 4 (a), the nodes which receive the RREQ packet process it as 
follows: 
1)  Check CF to confirm the broadcast type. When CF = 0, examine IPS, IPD and RREQ ID with 
cached values; 
a)  If all values are the same, drop the packet; 
b)  If not, cache IPS, IPD, RREQ ID and CF; 
2)  Add its own IP address into the intermediate list; 
3)  Hop-count + 1; 
4)  Construct a route back to where the RREQ packet came from; 
5)  Rebroadcast the RREQ packet and switch to waiting mode. The nodes in this mode can only 
used for transferring control packets. 
 
Figure 4. Route establishment in MHA protocol.  (a) Processing a RREQ packet. (b) 
Processing a RREP packet. 
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Figure 4. Cont. 
 
 
With the flooding of RREQ packets, the destination node finally receives them. The destination 
node then generates the RREP packets with following steps: 
1)  Copies IPS, IPD, RREQ ID and CF from the RREQ packet and writes in the corresponding 
field of the RREP packet, then sets the hop-count = 0; 
2)  Unicasts the RREP packet to the source node through each route. 
In Figure 4(b), when intermediate nodes receive the RREP packet, they process it as follows: 
1)  Hop-count + 1; 
2)  Compare IPS, IPD, RREP ID and CF with cached values; 
a)  If they are all the same, i.e., there already exists a route to the destination node, compare 
the new hop-count in the RREP packet with cached value. If the new one is smaller, or 
(b) Sensors 2009, 9                  
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the lifetime of the original route expired, replace the original route with the new one and 
renew the corresponding fields with values in the new RREP packet; otherwise, drop it; 
b)  If any of them are different, cache IPS, IPD, RREP ID, CF and hop-count. 
The destination node then establishes a route back to where the RREP packet came from and sets 
the route as active thus it can be used for transferring data packets. 
3.3. RREP number limit and Graylist Broadcast 
The RREP packets are finally sent back to the source node. In our MHA protocol, we set a RREP 
number limit (RREPlim) to consider the reasonable amount of routes that are found in a route discovery 
procedure. This is designed for a special circumstance in attacking RFC 3561. In Figure 5, there is a 
wormhole between a communication pair. Due to the better metric of the wormhole, the RREQ packet 
rebroadcast by the wormhole is accepted by the nodes around the destination node at first. 
Consequently, the RREQ packets which are flooded from the normal nodes later will be dropped. As a 
result, only the route through the wormhole can be established. 
 
Figure 5. Route establishment under the wormhole attack. 
 
 
The RREPlim can prevent this situation. This value can be adjusted according to the network 
circumstances. For example, in a highly trusted environment, where most nodes consist of familiar 
people, we can safely decrease the RREPlim value in the route discovery procedure. First, we set the 
default RREPlim, such as RREPlim = 2. After the source node receives all RREP packets, it compares 
the number of received RREP packets γ with RREPlim. If γ < RREPlim, it probably means that there is a 
wormhole, or too few nodes in the network. The source node then launches the graylist broadcast in 
this situation. 
The graylist broadcast contains the following steps: 
1)  CF + 1 in the RREQ packet; 
2)  Adds all intermediate nodes which are found in the last route discovery procedure into the 
graylist; 
3)  Broadcasts the RREQ packet with the graylist. Sensors 2009, 9                  
 
 
5030
In the graylist broadcast illustrated by Figure 6, the nodes handle the received RREQ packet in 
following steps: 
 
Figure 6. Graylist broadcast in MHA protocol. 
 
 
1)  Check CF to confirm the broadcast type. When CF ≠ 0, check IPS, IPD and RREQ ID to 
determine the communication pair; 
2)  Compare CF with the cached value; Sensors 2009, 9                  
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a)  If it is the same as the cached one, check the received graylist with the cached one; 
i)  If they are the same, drop the packet; 
ii)  If some values in the graylist are suspected to be modified by the malicious nodes, 
alert the source node of the modified value. The source node then marks the 
suspect IP address in the blacklist The blacklisted nodes will not be used for a 
period; 
b)  If CF is larger than the cached one, update the CF and graylist in the memory and check 
if the last hop in the RREQ packet is in the graylist; 
c)  If the last hop has been recorded in the graylist, drop the packet; if not, add its own IP 
address into the intermediate list; 
3)  Hop-count+1; 
4)  Construct a route back to the RREQ packet came from; 
5)  Rebroadcast the RREQ packet and enter the waiting mode of this route. 
The destination node receives the RREQ packet and replies RREP packets as usual. Finally, the 
source node receives the new RREP packets with a larger CF. The source node compares γ with 
RREPlim again and triggers another graylist broadcast until at least one of the following conditions is 
true: 
1)  γ ≥ RREPlim; 
2)  CF = 7. Considering efficiency, CF value in MHA reserves 3 bits, i.e., CFmax = 7; 
3)  No RREP packet reply, perhaps due to a too small quantity of nodes in the network. 
After the source node completes the route discovery and graylist broadcast, it continues to the hop-
count analysis and route path selection mechanism. 
 
3.4. Hop-Count Analysis Scheme and Route Selection 
 
In MHA, a route with too low or too high hop-count is considered unhealthy. A too low hop-count 
may imply a wormhole attack; while a too high hop-count may decelerate the transmission. 
Furthermore, a route with a high hop-count has a higher chance to break. 
In MHA, we define random variable X which represents the hop-count values in the received RREP 
packets, and U = {x1, … , xi, … , xj, …} is the sample space of random variable X. So we have its 
cumulative distribution function FX(x). We further define variables α and β which represent the lower 
bound and upper bound of the selected range on FX(x), then m and n will be the corresponding hop-
count boundaries. They are defined in Equation (1) as follows: 
U x x j i ∈ , ,  N n m j i ∈ , , ,  
1 0 < < < β α  
( ) { } α ≤ = i X i x F x m sup  
( ) { } β ≤ = j X j x F x n inf  
(1) 
Finally, we select the route paths from received RREP packets with hop-count xr which satisfies 
Equation (2): Sensors 2009, 9                  
 
 
5032
N r∈ ,  U xr ∈  
j r i x x x ≤ ≤   (2) 
as legal route paths in MHA protocol. The legal route paths are cached in the source node and given a 
TTL. Data packets are then transmitted randomly through these routes. If any of these legal route paths 
are broken, the source node deletes it from the cache. If all legal route paths are broken or vanished, 
and there is still a requirement for communication, the source node will carry out another route request 
procedure. 
In addition, the source node unicasts route acknowledgement (RACK) packets along all legal routes 
to the destination node before the first data packet is sent. The RACK packet contains the intermediate 
nodes of all legal routes and the expiration time. The destination node then caches them for further 
transmission. Once this step is completed, the bidirectional routes of a communication pair are 
established. 
 
3.5. Route Maintenance in MHA Routing Protocol 
 
3.5.1. Dealing with Broken Routes and RERR Packets 
 
As time passes, routes may break. When a node receives a data packet but can not reach the next 
hop in the routing table, it generates a RERR packet including IPS and IPD to notify the 
source/destination node. 
The source/destination node receives the RERR packet, deletes the broken route in memory and 
uses the RACK packet to notify the destination/source node to use other remaining routes. The 
destination/source node also deletes the route. Until the next route discovery procedure, the remaining 
routes are used for transmission. 
 
3.5.2. Cross-check the Route Paths 
 
In the MHA protocol, we give an expiration time for every route. All intermediate nodes delete the 
cached route after expiration to conserve memory. However, in certain environments, the nodes in the 
network may be static. These routes may persist over time. In order to have better efficiency, when 
routes of a communication pair are expired but are still in use, the source node unicasts a RACK 
packet with a new expiration time to the destination node through the valid routes. The intermediate 
nodes and the destination node then refresh the expiration time in their routing table. 
Consequently, we limit resource usage and recover some overhead that would originally be wasted 
by launching unneeded route discovery procedures. We also save memory of intermediate nodes that 
would otherwise be used for keeping idle routes. 
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4. Simulations 
 
To test our method, we develop an event driven simulator by using C and Matlab. The C program is 
used to set up the simulation environment and compute the actions of all nodes between route 
discovery processes. Then, we visualize the simulation results by using Matlab. 
We assumed each node is distributed randomly by the simulator, and each node will send and 
receive packets with different delays in an allocated range. The source establishes a route discovery 
and graylist broadcast by sending the RREQ packet. In response, the destination node replies with 
RREP packets. The source node then selects the legal routes. 
Furthermore, the simulator allows users to input the RREPlim value for each simulation. We can 
input different RREPlim for each simulation, and the simulator completes the graylist broadcast as 
required. 
In this section, we give four experiments to show the performance of the proposed protocol. In 
Table 2, we give the parameters used in the experiments. 
 
Table 2. Parameters for experiments. 
Parameter Value 
Number of nodes  300 
Field dimensions  2,000 m x 2,000 m 
Radio range  250m 
Node delay  Random @ 0.05~0.075 ms 
Trial 50  times 
 
4.1. Experiment 1 - Maximum Wormhole Effect 
 
In Exp. 1, we verify the avoidance rate of the maximum wormhole effect. That is, the wormhole is 
placed in the middle of the communication pair and other normal nodes are placed at random. 
Figure 7(a) shows the avoidance rate with different legal boundaries (α, β). 
We apply three kinds of boundaries in this experiment. With loose boundaries of (0.25, 0.75), only 
the routes with hop-counts in the middle 1/2 distribution are selected as legal. As a result, the 
avoidance rate is higher than 98% when RREPlim ≥ 4. With stricter boundaries of (0.33, 0.67), the 
avoidance rate is higher than 99% when RREPlim ≥ 3. 
Nevertheless, we design a dynamic boundary. We apply different boundaries (α, β) according to the 
received RREP numbers, e.g., we choose (0.5, 1) for received RREP number = 2, and (0.35, 1) for 
received RREP number = 3~4, and (0.25, 0.75) for received RREP number = 5~6, and so on. The 
dynamic boundary gives a better percentage in avoiding wormhole attacks and also enhances the 
performance by decreasing transmission distance in hops. Refer to Figure 5(a), as long as RREPlim ≥ 2, 
the avoidance rate can reach 100%. 
However, the wormhole attack is unavoidable when RREPlim = 1 for any boundaries, because the 
only established route goes through the wormhole. As the RREPlim increases, the avoidance rates of all 
boundaries raise. The effect on a strict boundary is more obvious than it is on a loose boundary. Sensors 2009, 9                  
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4.2. Experiment 2 - Random Wormhole Effect 
 
In Exp. 2, we verify the avoidance rate of the random wormhole effect, that is, all nodes including 
the wormhole and the communication pair are distributed at random. Then, we compare the effects of 
different boundaries and show its result in Figure 7(b).  
 
Figure 7. The comparison of avoidance rates in (a) Exp. 1 (b) Exp. 2. 
 
(a) 
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In this experiment, the effect from adjusting boundaries is not as clear as it is in Exp. 1. This is 
because the random wormhole does not have the best metric to some particular transmission pairs in 
routing. In this case, the inherent multipath transmission nature of MHA exhibits protection against 
wormholes by splitting data into different routes, so the attacker cannot launch further attacks. 
 
4.3. Experiment 3 & 4 - Overhead of MHA 
 
In Exp. 3, we examine the number of routes that have been found in each graylist broadcast under 
both maximum and random wormhole effect. The number of routes found for CF from 0 to 7 is shown 
in Figure 8(a). 
 
Figure 8. The overhead of MHA in (a) Exp. 3 (b) Exp. 4. 
 
(a) 
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In Exp. 4, we examine the transmission distance in MHA with dynamic boundary under the 
maximum wormhole effect. The lowest hops, i.e. the route found with AODV without wormhole, and 
average hops, i.e. the average of all available routes, are also shown together in Figure 8(b). 
 
5. Discussion and Comparison 
 
5.1. Discussion 
 
In Exp. 1, the avoidance rate of maximum wormhole effect is verified. We find when MHA applied 
with constant boundaries, the strict boundaries performs better than the loose ones in avoiding 
wormhole attack and the simulation result is shown in the Figure 5(a). The curve of the strict boundary 
rises faster than the loose one with the growth of RREPlim value. Furthermore, we present the dynamic 
boundary, which changes with the received RREP number, in order to improve accuracy and 
efficiency. As a result, it can avoid 100% of wormhole attacks when RREPlim ≥ 2. In Exp. 2, the 
avoidance rates for all RREPlim are over 96%. 
In Exp. 3, at CF = 1, i.e., only one graylist broadcast is needed, 2.3 and 3.74 routes are found on 
average under the maximum and random wormhole effects, respectively. Compared with Exp. 1 and 
Exp. 2, it performs with 100% and 96% avoidance rates, respectively. As a result, we can conclude 
that only one graylist broadcast is required for avoiding wormhole attacks, and further minimize 
overhead. In addition, multi-wormhole cases that have not been discussed in other previous works can 
be avoided by increasing the RREPlim value in MHA. On the other hand, if there is no wormhole 
within a closed environment, the graylist broadcast can be cancelled by setting RREPlim = 1 to save 
energy and bandwidth. 
In Exp. 3, we also find in our assumed environment, most independent routes can be found when 
CF < 6. In Exp. 4, the transmission distance of MHA is longer than the shortest route by about one hop, 
but below the average of all routes. This is because with MHA, the routes with higher hops are also 
filtered out. In addition, the shortest route can represent the route discovered by AODV in safe 
environments. It shows our judicious use of an extra hop (on average) to grant us a great amount of 
protection against wormhole attacks in comparison to AODV. 
Our method provides good performance for avoiding wormhole attacks, but there could be some 
attacks anticipating MHA. For example, attackers may add fake nodes to an intermediate list so the 
route has a longer distance. However, it is quite hard for attackers to correctly estimate the expected 
hops of a particular communication pair since they do not know their relative position. In addition, 
since we only select part of the searched routes for multi-path transmission, the probability that attacks 
can occupy the route are further reduced. In another scenario, attackers may maliciously modify other 
nodes instead of itself in the graylist. Thus the nodes that have been modified would be reported as 
modifiers and be blocked by the source node. To counter this, some ID-based cryptographic 
methods [19] such as digital signatures can be adopted to prevent this. 
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5.2. Comparison 
 
Most of the protocols proposed in literature can reach high avoidance rates in their experiments. 
However, they all need some impractical assumptions or special hardware as listed in Table 3. The 
MHA routing protocol does not need impractical assumptions, such as precise synchronized time, zero 
delay time, or the awareness of all node locations, and so on, which are usually assumed in the 
schemes adopting the viewpoint of administrator. In addition, MHA does not need any special 
hardware either. Due to its simple concept, the hop-count analysis scheme can improve most routing 
protocols in MANET as well. The nodes only need to sort the received hop-counts, and select the legal 
ones according to the preset boundaries. Thus the computation overhead is very low for this process. 
 
Table 3. Comparisons on related works and MHA. 
Mechanism Special  assumptions 
Special 
hardware 
Overhead 
Our proposed scheme (MHA)  No  No  Low 
TIK-scheme [9] 
Zero delay time on nodes 
Slower wormhole 
Precisely synchronized time 
Predictable transmission time 
Off-line hash computation 
No High 
LBK-scheme [11]  Beacon retransmission of wormhole  Guards  High 
MDS-VOW-scheme[10] 
Sensor network 
Statistic topology 
Constant radio strength 
Control 
center 
High 
 
We compare MHA with previous works in Table 3. In [9], a large amount of hash tree computation 
is required. In their discussion, the optimized condition performs 10 million hash function evaluations 
in 7.544 seconds on a Pentium III running at 1 GHz; and 45 seconds on a Compaq iPAQ 3870 
PocketPC running Linux. A long waiting time for system setup shows their high overhead. In [11], all 
transmissions between node pairs have to be encrypted by the local broadcast key of the sending end 
and decrypted at the receiving end. As a result, the time delay accumulates per node traveled. The 
MDS-VOW mechanism in [10] uses a control center to accomplish the O(n
3) operations if there are n 
nodes. This is a fairly heavy load for the control center. 
 
6. Conclusion and Future Works 
 
In this paper, a novel scheme based on an intuitive method to avoid wormhole attacks in MANET is 
proposed. The defining characteristic of this method is avoiding wormhole attacks from the viewpoint 
of users instead of the administrator’s viewpoint as in previous works. We provide four simulations to 
show the proposed scheme has high efficiency and very good performance with low overhead. In Sensors 2009, 9                  
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addition, this scheme does not require additional hardware or impractical assumptions of the networks. 
Hence, it can be directly used in MANET. 
Although we have proposed a solution for the wormhole attack problem in MANET, the dynamic 
information of the packets could still be modified. This issue can be solved by some cryptographic 
method, such as a homomorphic one-way hash function. The static data, i.e. payload, can be secured 
by ID-based signature. These methods can also be adopted for MHA to give a more robust protection 
in some special scenarios like battlefields, which need a highly secured environment. 
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